Estes v. Lewiston Independent School Dist. No. 1 Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 39469 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-2-2012
Estes v. Lewiston Independent School Dist. No. 1
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39469
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Estes v. Lewiston Independent School Dist. No. 1 Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39469" (2012). Not Reported. 717.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/717
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DAVID ESTES, ) 
) 




LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL ) 
DISTRICT NO. 1; JOY RAPP, in her capacity ) 
as Superintendent of Lewiston School District ) 
No. 1; SHERI ALLEN, BRAD RICE, DAN ) 
RUDOLPH, BRENDA FORGE, BILL DA VIS, ) 
collectively as the Board of Trustees of the ) 
Lewiston School District No. 1, ) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
Supreme Court No. 39469-2011 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District in and for the County of Nez Perce 
The Honorable Carl B. Kerrick, District Judge, Presiding 
Bentley G. Stromberg, ISB# 3737 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
David M. Estes 
PROSE 
1308 10th Avenue 
Lewiston, ID 8350 I 
Appellant-Plaintiff 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DAVID ESTES, ) 
) 




LEWISTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL ) 
DISTRICT NO. 1; JOY RAPP, in her capacity ) 
as Superintendent of Lewiston School District ) 
No. 1; SHERI ALLEN, BRAD RICE, DAN ) 
RUDOLPH, BRENDA FORGE, BILL DA VIS, ) 
collectively as the Board of Trustees of the ) 
Lewiston School District No. 1, ) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents. ) 
Supreme Court No. 39469-2011 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District in and for the County of Nez Perce 
The Honorable Carl B. Kerrick, District Judge, Presiding 
Bentley G. Stromberg, ISB# 3737 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A. 
Post Office Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
David M. Estes 
PROSE 
1308 10th Avenue 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Appellant-Plaintiff 
I. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1v 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
A. Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
B. Statement of the Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
C. Course of the Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
IV. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
V. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
A. Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
B. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Estes Lacked Standing 
To Bring The Lawsuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Lawsuit is Moot ... 8 
D. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Lawsuit Is Not 
Ripe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
VII. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE................................... 13 
-1-
II. 
TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES 
Cases: Page 
Ameritel Inns v. Greater Boise Auditorium District, 
141 Idaho 849, 119 P.3d 624 (2005)............................. 8 
Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County. 
128 Idaho 371, 913 P.2d 1141 (1996) . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
East Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 
122 Idaho 679, 837 P.2d 805 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Farm Credit Bank o{Spokane v. Stevenson. 
125 Idaho 270, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Fenn v. Noah. 
142 Idaho 775, 113 P.3d 1240 (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Gallagher v. State. 
141 Idaho 665, 115 P.3d 756 (2005).............................. 7, 8 
Idaho Schools v. Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. Of Educ .. 
128 Idaho 276, 912 P.2d 644 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10, 12 
Martin v Camas County Board of Commissioners, 
150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1248 (2011)............................. 6 
Miles v. Idaho Power Co .. 
116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8 
Noh v. Cenarrusa, 
137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d 1217 (2002) .. . . . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. .. . . . . 5 
Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc. 
139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 951 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
-11-
Selkirk-Priest Basin Association, Inc. State ex rel. Batt. 
128 Idaho 831,919 P.2d 1032 (1996)............................. 7 
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 
86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood. Chtd, 
150 Idaho 521m, 248 P.3d 1263 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Student Loan Fund v. Payette County, 
125 Idaho 824, 875 P.2d 236 (Ct.App. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Thomson v. City o(Lewiston, 
137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency. Inc .. 
126 Idaho 527, 887 P.2d 1034 (1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
Troutner v. Kempthorne, 
142 Idaho 389, 128 P.3d 926 (2006) 7, 8 
Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits. 
135 Idaho 121, 15 P.3d 1129 (2000).............................. 5 
Waste Management o(Alameda County. Inc .• v. County o(Alameda. 
79 Cal.App.4th 1223, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8 
Webb v. Webb, 
143 Idaho 521, 148 P.3e 1267 (2006)............................. 11 
Wylie v. State of Idaho et al., 
151 Idaho 26,253 P.3d 700 (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 8 
Young v. City o(Ketchum, 
137 Idaho 102, 44 P.3d 1157 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7, 8 
Zingiber Investment. LLC v. Hagerman Highway District, 
150 Idaho 675,249 P.3d 868 (2011) .. . . . . . . .. .. .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . .. 6 
-lll-
OTHER AUTHORITIES: 
Black's Law Dictionary, 1110 (6th ed.1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
-IV-
III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff, David M. Estes ("Estes"), filed a prose Complaint against Lewiston 
Independent School District No. I, its Superintendent and its Board of Trustees (collectively, 
"the District") arising out of the District's alleged failure to timely swear-in a newly elected 
Trustee. The Complaint sought a declaration that that the District had not complied with 
Idaho law and an order directing the District to comply with the law. After the Complaint 
was filed, the District promptly swore-in the newly elected Trustee, and then moved for 
summary judgment on standing and mootness grounds. The district court granted the 
District's motion, and this appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
On May 17, 2011, the District held an election for a soon to be open School 
District Trustee position. (R., p. 5). Dale D. Yochum ran for the position and won. (Id.). 
Estes was Mr. Yochum's campaign manager. (Id.). 
On or about June 14, 2011, Estes asked the District Superintendent when Mr. 
Yochum would be sworn in, and was told that he would be sworn in on July 13, 2011. @., 
p. 7). 
On June 17, 2011, Estes filed a lawsuit alleging that the proposed July 13, 2001 
swearing-in date was not as soon as it should be under Idaho law, and that as a consequence, 
he was being disenfranchised, his constitutional rights were being threatened and diminished, 
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and diminished, and he was being denied a voice on the school board through his duly 
elected representative. (Id., pp. 4-9). The Complaint sought an order "declaring that 
defendants have improperly applied State ofldaho election laws and procedures" and "a Writ 
and/or order compelling defendants to promptly comply with the laws of the State ofldaho." 
(Id., p. 8). 
On June 27, 2011 - ten days after the Complaint was filed-the District swore-
in Mr. Yochum as a Trustee. {Id., p. 222). 
C. Course of the Proceedings. 
On July 6, 201, the District filed an Answer to Estes' Complaint which raised 
standing and mootness as defenses. 
On July 26, 2011, Estes filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. @., pp. 31-
207). In the Motion, Estes argued that he had standing and that the matter was not moot. He 
also claimed that the State's election laws regarding the time for swearing-in Trustees 
conflicted with the District's Charter, and he sought an Order directing the District to comply 
with its Charter instead of the State's election laws. ((Id., p. 47). 
On August 16, 2011, the District filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting Memorandum arguing that Estes lacked standing to bring the lawsuit and that the 
lawsuit was moot. (Id., pp. 208-220). 
A hearing was held on September 27, 2011. At the hearing, the parties agreed 
that Estes' summary judgment motion could not be heard until the court ruled on the 
District's motion. {Tr., pp. 8-9). 
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On October 21, 2011, the district court issued a Memorandum Opinion and 
Order granting the District's motion on both standing and mootness grounds, and on the 
additional ground that Estes' claim that the District's Charter rather than the State's election 
laws applied to the swearing-in of Trustees was not ripe because no one was seeking to be 
sworn in at that time. (l_g., pp. 224-233). 
A Judgment dismissing the Complaint was filed on November 1, 2011. (Id., pp. 
234-235). 
On December 8, 2011, Estes filed a timely Notice of Appeal, which was later 
amended to correct technical deficiencies. (Id., pp. 236-237 and 239-241). 
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IV. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the district court correctly conclude that Estes lacked standing to bring the 
lawsuit? 
2. Did the district court correctly conclude that the lawsuit was moot? 




A. Standard Of Review. 
Summary judgment is to be granted when the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. 
I.R.P.C. 56(c). In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court 
applies the same standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment. East Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 679,681,837 P.2d 805,807 
( 1992); Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 
(1994); and Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 529, 887 P.2d 1034, 1036 
( 1994 ). If the evidence reveals no disputed material facts, what remains is a question oflaw, 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 
Idaho 207, 209, 76 P.3d 951, 953 (2003). 
B. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Estes Lacked Standing To Bring 
The Lawsuit. 
"It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to 
invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing." Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term 
Limits, 135Idaho 121,124, 15P.3d 1129, 1132(2000). Ifaplaintifflacksstanding,thecase 
is not justiciable. Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 800, 53 P.3d 1217, 1219 (2002). 
Accordingly, a court must resolve the issue of whether a plaintiff has standing before it can 
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consider the merits of a claim. Martin v. Camas County, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1243, 
1248(2011 ). Summary judgment is a proper procedural method for dismissing a claim based 
on lack of standing. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 
(2002); and Zingiber Investment, LLC, v. Hagerman Highway District, 150 Idaho 675,249 
P .3d 868, 873 (2011) 
As stated in Youngv. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 
(2002): 
Standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the 
issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. To satisfy the case 
or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must allege or 
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the 
relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. This 
requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly 
traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the 
challenged conduct. But even if a showing can be made of an 
injury in fact, standing may be denied when the asserted harm is 
a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens. 
137 Idaho at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159 (internal citations, quotations and footnote omitted). Thus, 
standing requires a "distinct, palpable injury" which is not "a generalized grievance shared by 
all or a large class of citizens." 
A "palpable injury" is an injury which is '"[ e ]asily perceptible, plain, obvious, 
readily visible, noticeable, patent, distinct, manifest."' Martin v. Camas County Board of 
Commissioners, 150 Idaho 508, 248 P. 3d 1243, 1248 (2011) (th. 3), quoting, Black's Law 
Dictionary, 1110 ( 6th ed. 1990). 
Here, Estes did not demonstrate that he sustained a "distinct palpable injury". 
That is, he did not show that the alleged erroneous delay in swearing in Mr. Yochum and the 
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alleged error in setting the swearing-in date caused him some individualized harm. At most, 
Estes speculated that if Mr. Yochum had been sworn in earlier, Mr. Yochum would have 
persuaded the other four members of the Board to act in some other, unspecified way. 
However, injuries which are speculative are not distinct and palpable and therefore do not 
create standing. Martin, 248 P. 3d at 1248. 
Furthermore, the alleged delay Estes complains of and the alleged error in 
setting the swearing-in date would constitute generalized grievances shared by the District's 
patrons as a whole, and the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that citizens who have 
a general grievance shared by a large class of citizens have not suffered a distinct palpable 
injury for standing purposes. Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389,392, 128 P.3d 926,929 
(2006); Gallagherv. State, 141 Idaho 665,668, 115 P.3d 756, 759 (2005); Young, 137 Idaho 
at 104, 44 P.3d at 1159; and Selkirk-Priest Basin Association, Inc. v. State ex rel. Batt, 128 
Idaho 831, 833-834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1034-1035 (1996). 
Estes claims that his status as a concerned citizen gave him standing to sue, and 
he cites Miles v. Idaho Power, Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989), State ex 
rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999), 
and Waste Management of Alameda County, Inc. v. County of Alameda, 79 Cal.App.4th 
1223, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 740 (2000) in support of his position. However, the Court in Miles did 
not find standing based on the plaintiffs' status as concerned citizens. Instead, the Court 
found standing based on the distinct, palpable injury the Idaho Power Company rate payers 
were claiming they would suffer. Miles, 116 Idaho at 642, 778 P.2d at 764. Furthermore, the 
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Sheward and Waste Management cases are contrary to controlling Idaho precedent 
establishing that in Idaho, an interest as a concerned citizen in seeing that the government 
abides by the law does not confer standing. Student Loan Fundv. Payette County, 125 Idaho 
824,828, 875 P.2d 236,240 (Ct.App. 1994); Young, 137 Idaho at 105, 44 P.3d at 1160; and 
Troutner, 142 Idaho at 392, 128 P.3d at 929. 
Estes also claimed that his status as a District taxpayer, resident and elector 
gave him standing to pursue the lawsuit. However, Idaho's appellate courts have held that 
absent a distinct, palpable, non-generalized injury, such status does not establish standing. 
Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 668 (2005); Student Loan Fund. 125 Idaho at 828, 875 
P.3d at 240; and Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium District, 141 Idaho 849, 
852, 119 P.3d 624, 627 (2005). 
In short, Estes did not show that he sustained a "distinct, palpable injury" which 
was not "a generalized grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens" due to the alleged 
delay in swearing-in Mr. Yochum and the alleged error in setting the swearing-in date. 
Accordingly, he lacked standing to pursue this lawsuit, and the district court correctly granted 
the District's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Lawsuit Is Moot. 
In Wylie v. State of Idaho et al., 151 Idaho 26, 253 P .3d 700 (2011 ), the Idaho 
Supreme Court summarized the law ofmootness as follows: 
"Justiciability is generally divided into subcategories-
advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing, 
ripeness, mootness, political questions, and administrative 
questions." Miles v. Idaho Power, Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 
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778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). The elements of a justiciable 
controversy include the following: 
A "controversy" in this sense must be one that is 
appropriate for judicial determination. A 
justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from 
a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or 
abstract character; from one that is academic or 
moot. The controversy must be definite and 
concrete, touching the legal relations of the 
parties having adverse legal interests. It must be a 
real and substantial controversy admitting of 
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive 
character, as distinguished from an opinion 
advising what the law would be upon a 
hypothetical state of facts. 
Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of 
Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281-82, 912 P.2d 644, 649-50 (1996). 
Therefore, courts will not rule on declaratory judgment 
actions which present questions that are moot or abstract. Id, at 
282, 912 P.2d at 650. "An action for declaratory judgment is 
moot where the judgment, if granted, would have no effect 
either directly or collaterally on the plaintiff, the plaintiff would 
be unable to obtain further relief based on the judgment and no 
other relief is sought in the action." Id. Whether an issue is 
moot is to be determined at the time of the court's trial or 
hearing, and not at the time of commencing the action. Id. 
However, 
[t]he Court may nonetheless rule on a moot issue 
( 1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal 
consequences imposed on the person raising the 
issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to 
evade judicial review and thus is capable of 
repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue 
raises concerns of substantial public interest. 
Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd.150 Idaho 521, 528, 248 
P.3d 1256, 1263 (201 l)(internal quotation omitted). 
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253 P.3d at 705-706. Further, as stated in Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 779, 133 P.3d 1240, 
1244 (2006): "Mootness ... applies when a favorable judicial decision would not result in 
any relief." 
Here, Estes' Complaint seeks an order "declaring that defendants have 
improperly applied State of Idaho election laws and procedures" and "a Writ and/or order 
compelling defendants to promptly comply with the laws of the State ofldaho." (R., p. 8). 
However, it is undisputed that the District swore-in Mr. Yochum in as a Trustee on June 27, 
2011. Thus, neither the Writ nor the declaration Estes sought would have had any effect on 
Estes either directly or collaterally and would not provide him with any specific relief. 
Furthermore, none of the grounds which justify ruling on a moot issue are 
present in this case. There is no possibility of collateral legal consequences being imposed 
on Estes if this Court agrees that the case is moot. The challenged conduct is not likely to 
evade judicial review because if the conduct ever occurs again, it can be challenged at that 
time by an individual with standing and in a context where the court would not be 
impermissibly "advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Idaho 
Schools for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281-82, 912 
P .2d 644, 649-50 ( 1996). And given that the issues in this case can be raised if necessary in 
the future by an individual with standing, this case does not involve matters of such 
substantial public interest that ruling on a moot issue is justified. 
In short, this lawsuit is moot and the district court properly granted the 
District's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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D. The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Lawsuit Is Not Ripe. 
Although neither Estes nor the District directly addressed ripeness in their 
summary judgment briefing, ripeness is a justiciability issue which the district court was 
obligated to address sua sponte because it is jurisdictional. See, Miles, 116 Idaho at 639, 
778 P.2d at 761 (ripeness is ajusticiability issue); and Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521,524, 
148 P.3d 1267, 1270 (2006)(courts are obligated to raise justiciability issues sua sponte 
because they are jurisdictional). 
Ripeness asks whether court action is necessary at the present time. Boundary 
Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371,376,913 P.2d 1141, 1146 (1996). As the 
district court correctly noted: 
In the case at hand, there is no indication that court action is 
necessary at the present time, especially in light of the fact that 
Mr. Yochum is sworn in and functioning as a trustee on the 
school board. The Court understands the Plaintiffs concern that 
there may be a conflict between the school charter and the 
election laws; however, it is not an issue that is properly 
resolved before this Court at this time because there is no person 
waiting to be sworn in as a member of the board.4 This is a 
matter that is best considered by the legislative branch of the 
government. Should an individual be voted in as trustee and this 
matter arise again, this matter would become ripe for review at 
that time. 
4Addressing Plaintiffs concerns regarding the 
possible conflict of law would result in an 
advisory opinion on this issue, which is not the 
appropriate function of this Court. "This Court is 
not empowered to issue purely advisory 
opinions." MDS Investments, L.L.C. v. State, 138 
Idaho 456, 464-465, 65 P.3d 197, 205-206 (2003). 
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(R., pp. 231-232). 
In short, because there was no person waiting to be sworn-in at the time, Estes 
claim that the State election law conflicts with the District's Charter was not ripe for review. 
And, as pointed out above, if the issue ever arises again, it can be addressed at that time by 
an individual with standing and in a context where the court would not be impermissibly 
"advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Idaho Schools for 
Equal Educ. Opportunity, 128 Idaho at 281-82, 912 P.2d at 649-50 (1996). 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's Order granting the District's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of June, 2012. 
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